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ABSTRACT: 
Immanuel Kant and Fritz Jahr have a similar cultural background, despite the almost two 
century’s gap between their lifetimes. Th ey were both raised in protestant tradition and lived 
their whole lives in towns with rich cultural heritage of the Prussian Kingdom.
In the light of these contextual circumstances, Jahr’s inspiration by Kant is not so surprising. 
Jahr quotes Kant, but – what is more important – he takes terminology of Kant’s practical 
philosophy in formulation of his own views. Th e most striking example is Jahr’s formulation 
of his Bioethical Imperative which directly echoes Kant’s (ethical) categorical imperative.
Th ose two imperatives are compared and some points about possible challenges and perspec-
tives which Jahr’s views pose to Kant’s thought have been given.
Keywords: categorical imperative, Immanuel Kant, Bioethical Imperative, Fritz Jahr
Introduction: some points on thecultural background of two 
philosophers
Even though, especially to "an analytically minded philosopher, the biography of a 
thinker is simply irrelevant, since it says nothing about the truth of his position and 
adds nothing to the soundness of his arguments", we could hardly not be in agree-
ment with the instructive consideration of Manfred Kuehn: "the lack of context – 
or perhaps better, the substitution of an anachronistic context – often stands in the 
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way of appreciating what a philosopher wanted to say."1 Having these thoughts in 
mind, at least some points on cultural background of Immanuel Kant and Fritz Jahr 
should be stressed before we investigate the relations between them. Th ere are at 
least two similar points underlying their lives which should not be overlooked – 
protestant tradition and Prussian culture: both of them spent their whole lives in 
their birthplaces2, towns with signifi cant cultural heritage of the Prussian Kingdom 
and both were deeply connected with Protestantism.
Immanuel Kant was born in 1724, lived, and died in 1804 in Königsberg, a seaport 
in East Prussia, located where the River Pregel fl ows into the Baltic Sea. In Kant’s 
time, the city was an isolated eastern outpost of German culture, and remains as 
such until the middle of the twentieth century.3 Th e city became the university 
centre and the seat of protestant learning very early. Th e University of Königsberg 
was founded by Duke Albrecht of Prussia in 1544 (the so-called Albertina) and be-
came the centre of Protestant teachings. Martin Luther himself assisted Duke Albre-
cht with advice and some authors say that Wittenberg could be called the intellec-
tual mother of Königisberg.4 Th e city has an important place in German history 
and culture. It "was originally the capital of East Prussia, the base of Prussian power 
before the acquisition of Brandenburg and the growth of Berlin, and in Kant’s time 
it remained the administrative center of East Prussia and a leading Hanseatic mer-
cantile city, the most important outlet east of Danzig for the vast Polish and Lithu-
anian hinterlands."5 Even though "it was never a capital of art and culture, in 
Kant’s time", stresses Paul Guyer, the city "was a business, legal, military, and educa-
tional center with many connections to the rest of Europe."6 Th e city was extreme-
ly important in the time of the rising of Prussian state, and it was the crowning 
place of the fi rst Prussian king – Frederick William I.7
1 Kuehn, Manfred, Kant: A Biography, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 19.
2 It is very interesting that both philosophers lived their whole lives in their birthplaces. Kant went outside 
Königsberg just during his practice as private teacher and even refused a few off ers from prestigious universities 
in other towns (Erlangen, Jenna, Halle). Fritz Jahr lived his entire life even at the same address in Halle(!). (Cf. 
Kuehn, M., op. cit., passim and Sass, Hans-Martin, "Postscriptum and References", in: Sass, Hans-Martin (ed.), 
Selected Essays in Bioethics 1927-1934: Fritz Jahr, Zentrum für Medizinische Ethik, Bochum, 2010, p. 25.)
3 After the Second World War Königsberg "was ethnically cleansed of its German population, renamed 
Kaliningrad (after a thoroughly hateful Stalinist henchman), and became what it still is, an isolated western 
outpost of Russian culture." Wood, Allen W., Kant, Blackwell Publishing, Malden – Oxford – Carlton, 2005, p. 3.
4 Cf. Barnstorff , Hermann, "Th e Rise of the German Universities", Th e Modern Language Journal, Vol. 23, No. 
4, Jan. 1939, p. 285, and Shennan, Margaret, Th e Rise of Brandenburg Prussia, Routledge, London – New York, 
1995, p. 5.
5 Guyer, Paul, Kant, Routledge, London – New York, 2006, p. 16.
6 Ibid.
7 Cf. Shennan, M., op. cit., p. 43, and Gawthrop, Richard L., Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century 
Prussia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 64–65.
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Fritz Jahr was born in 1895, lived, and died in 1953 in Halle, a city in the south of 
Saxony-Anhalt and is located on the river Saale. As a new university place and prot-
estant centre Halle got in direct rivalry with Königsberg. Th e University of Halle 
was founded in 1694, and was very successful: "the free spirit attracted the best 
teachers, of whom the philosopher and rationalist Christian Wolff 8 became the 
center."9 With the tacit approval of the king Frederick himself "the fi rst leader of 
the Pietists in Germany, Philipp Jacob Spener (1635–1705) (...) and his followers, 
August Hermann Francke (1663–1727), a theologian and orientalist, and the dis-
tinguished philosopher Christian Th omasius (1655–1728), established Pietism in 
the new university of Halle. Th omasius broke new ground by lecturing in German 
rather than Latin. In addition, by separating philosophy from theology he was to 
make Halle the leading centre for the new cultural thought in Protestant 
Germany."10
Königsberg and Halle are undoubtedly the two pillars of German culture, which is 
especially formed on the basis of Protestantism. Both towns were fi rm seats of pie-
tism, a movement within Lutheranism (Protestantism), indeed they were rivals in 
creating the pietism’s fundaments of German culture.11
Kant was raised in pietism and Jahr himself was a protestant pastor. Having in mind 
the tradition which connects these two thinkers, these facts are not of little impor-
tance. Some authors, despite the historical discontinuities and unsuspected conti-
nuities, argue for the idea of the "long story" of German philosophy inside the 
framework of possibility of a German "national history of philosophy"12. Such 
framework connects Kant and Jahr, especially in terms of "characteristically Prussian 
ethos", which "fi rst crystallized and gained wide spread acceptance during the reign 
of Frederick William I (1713-1740)"13, i.e. during the time of Kant’s youth and 
maturation. Th is ethos "laid the basis for the subsequent infl uence of ‘Prussianism’ 
on the development of modern Germany"14, Germany of Fritz Jahr’s time. It is im-
portant to bear in mind that this ethos "can be best understood in terms of the his-
8 On Leibniz’s recommendation Christian Wolff  (1679–1754) "was appointed Professor of Mathematics in 
1707, a position he held for sixteen years. Wolff  was known as an exponent of Rationalism and he became a leading 
fi gure in the German Enlightenment." Shennan, M., op. cit., p. 65.
9 Barnstorff , H., op. cit., p. 287.
10 Shennan, M., op. cit., pp. 63–65.
11 Th is rivalry was especially prominent after the founding of the University of Halle, which could be seen "as a 
continuation of the rivalry between Saxony and Brandenburg-Prussia, initiated by Frederick William, for regional 
supremacy and for leadership within German Protestantism as a whole." (Gawthrop, R., op. cit., p. 61.)
12 Cf. especially Beck, Lewis White, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors, Th e Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969, pp. 1–15.
13 Gawthrop, R., op. cit., p. i.
14 Ibid.
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tory of German ascetic Protestantism, especially Lutheran Pietist movement", which 
"emphasized a ‘bornagain’ conversion, followed by a highly disciplined life centered 
around ‘doing good for others’."15
Kant and Jahr are both deeply enrooted in German culture and protestant tradition. 
It is important to be aware of such cultural continuum between them if we want to 
understand Kant’s infl uence present in Jahr’s writings.16 Bearing this in mind, it is 
not so surprising that Jahr took the fundamental concept of Kant’s ethics – the con-
cept of imperative – to ground his vision of bioethics. Th e mentioned view based on 
"doing good for others" has perhaps had the greatest refl ection and the most im-
pressive formulation exactly in the concept of the imperative as the guiding law of 
human moral conduct.
Kant’s categorical imperative
If we want to understand what is contained in the concept of categorical imperative 
it is always the best to follow the Kant himself. Kant’s work Groundwork of the Met-
aphysics of Morals is "nothing more than the search for and establishment of the su-
preme principle of morality, which constitutes by itself a business that in its purpose 
is complete and to be kept apart from every other moral investigation." (4:39217). 
Th us, we should focus on the presentation of this "complete business" and our main 
reference should be the Groundwork18.
At the beginning of the First section of the Groundwork Kant asserts: "It is impossi-
ble to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that would be 
considered good without limitation except a good will" (4:393). However, "without 
the basic principles of the good will they [aff ects and passions, added: I.E.] can be-
come extremely evil" (4:394), and we need some a priori (which means necessary 
and universal) rule of reason which could guide our will in moral conduct. Th ese 
thoughts bring us to the concept of duty, which "is the necessity of an action from re-
spect for law" (4:400). Acting out of duty is "acting with inner rational moral con-
straint, motivated solely by the thought of following a moral principle. Th e crucial 
claim is that we think there is something uniquely worthy of esteem about a person 
15 Ibid.
16 Jahr himself often quotes Kant and other thinkers, which is one of the marks of the infl uence of his predecessors 
on his thoughts.
17 Kant’s writings are cited in the body of the text according to volume and page number in Kants gesammelte 
Schriften, edited by Königliche Preußische [now Deutsche] Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, Georg Reimer 
[now Walter De Gruyter], 1902–). All translations are taken from Guyer, Paul – Wood, Allen W. (eds.), Th e 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992ff .
18 I will use abbreviated title further in text.
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who fulfi ls their duty in the absence of (or even in opposition to) all other induce-
ments of inclination or self-interest, solely out of respect for the moral law."19 "But 
what kind of law can that be", asks Kant, "the representation of which must deter-
mine the will, even without regard for the eff ect expected from it, in order for the 
will to be called absolutely and without limitation?" (4:402). His answer is that the 
purely rational appeal of a universally valid practical principle is the only thing that 
could motivate us, and he gives the fi rst formulation of what we may call the For-
mula of Universal Law20: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also 
will that my maxim21 should become a universal law" (4:402). In this formulation 
there are implicitly contained all main ideas which he goes on to develop and it is 
the basis for his systematic exposition of the supreme principle of morality which 
takes place in the Second section of the Groundwork. In this section the crucial idea 
is the idea of categorical imperative as an articulation of the moral law.
Kant begins with the extensive theory of human agency. Shortly, for Kant we are 
"agents who are self-directing in the sense that we have the capacity to step back 
from our natural desires, refl ect on them, consider whether and how we should sat-
isfy them, and be moved by them only on the basis of such refl ections. An inclina-
tion (or habitual desire we fi nd in ourselves empirically) moves us to act only when 
we choose to set its object as an end for ourselves, and this choice then sets us the 
task of selecting or devising a means to that end."22 For Kant, setting an end is the 
basic normative act. Many acts command us to perform an action as a means to 
some wanted end. Such command is stated in the form of hypothetical imperative. 
Hypothetical, because it articulates the needed means for some particular end, and 
imperative, because it is the command of reason requiring the agent to do some-
thing (e.g. If you want to end hunger, take some food).
But the fundamental principle of morality should be unconditionally valid and nec-
essary true, thus the form of hypothetical imperative is inappropriate for moral 
guidance. Kant claims that only rational beings (including humans) have "the ca-
pacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is in accordance with 
principles", while "everything in nature works in accordance with laws" (4:412). 
19 Wood, Allen W., "Th e supreme principle of morality", in: Guyer, Paul (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Kant and 
Modern Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 347.
20 Kant scholars use this designation widely. Th ere are other abbreviations used in Kantian scholarship which will 
be introduced below. For such usage see for example Wood, Allen W., Kantian Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2008, pp. 66–67., Guyer, P., op. cit., pp. 191–207.
21 Kant is very clear about the distinction between maxims, as the subjective principles of our volition, and 
laws, as the objective principles of it: "A maxim is the subjective principle of volition; the objective principle (i.e. 
that which would also serve as subjectively as the practical principle for all rational beings if reason had complete 
control over the faculty of desire) is the practical law." (4:402f )
22 Wood, A. W., "Th e Supreme...", p. 348.
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With this claim Kant opens the door for his arguments about rational beings as si-
multaneously free beings. Rational beings could only act according to principles 
which are not present in nature, as natural laws. Such principles are part of special, 
moral realm. Th us, fundamental principle of morality is presented to us in the form 
of "categorical imperative", because only such imperative is not based on some con-
tingent ends (as is the case with hypothetical imperative) and gives a basis for un-
conditional and necessary validity. Categorical imperative "tells you what you must 
do independent of any end you might have."23 In other words, "a moral imperative 
is categorical because its function is not to advise us how to reach some prior end of 
ours that is based on what we happen to want but instead to command us how to 
act irrespective of our wants or our contingent ends. Its rational bindingness is 
therefore not conditional on our setting any prior end."24
Kant then argues that:
When I think of a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. For, 
since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that the 
maxim be in conformity with this law, while the law contains no condition to 
which it would be limited, nothing is left with which the maxim of action is 
to conform but the universality of a law as such; and this conformity alone is 
what the imperative properly represents as necessary. (4:420–421)
And he further explicates the notions of "maxim" and "law" in a footnote:
A maxim is the subjective principle of acting and must be distinguished from 
the objective principle, namely the practical law. Th e former contains the 
practical rule determined by reason conformably with the conditions of the 
subject (often his ignorance or also his inclinations), and is therefore the 
principle in accordance with which the subject acts; but the law is objective 
principle valid for every rational being , and the principle in accordance with 
which he ought to act, i.e. an imperative. (4:420–421f)
To put it in a few words, Kant argues that human beings, as rational beings, are 
self-governing beings who should be guided by the moral law, and the only form of 
such law could be given in the form of categorical imperative. Such imperative articu-
lates and expresses a universally valid moral law, on the basis of which we ought to act. 
23 Guyer, P., op. cit., p. 184.
24 Wood, A. W., Kantian Ethics..., p. 67.
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"Kant actually formulates the categorical imperative in fi ve diff erent ways25, al-
though he himself refers to only three."26 For the purposes of this paper it is enough 
to follow these three main formulations. Allen Wood diff erentiates three main for-
mulas of categorical imperative in Groundwork and various variants of them. Even 
though we shall focus on the three mentioned formulas, it is instructive to list all of 
them, with Wood’s abbreviations and designation of each of them:
FIRST FORMULA: 
FUL Th e Formula of Universal Law: "Act only in accordance with that 
maxim through which you at the same time can will that it become a 
universal law" (4:421; cf. 4:402); with its variant, 
FLN Th e Formula of the Law of Nature: "So act, as if the maxim of your action 
were to become through your will a universal law of nature" (4:421; cf. 4:436).
SECOND FORMULA: 
FH Th e Formula of Humanity as End in Itself: "So act that you use humanity, 
as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the 
same time as an end and never merely as a means" (4:429; cf. 4:436).
THIRD FORMULA: 
FA Formula of Autonomy: "the idea of the will of every rational being as a will 
giving universal law" (4:431; cf. 4:432), or "Not to choose otherwise than so 
that the maxims of one’s choice are at the same time comprehended with it in 
the same volition as universal law" (4:440; cf. 4:432, 4:434, 4:438), with its 
variant, 
FRE Th e Formula of the Realm of Ends: "Act in accordance with maxims of a 
universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends" (4:439; 
cf. 4:433, 4:437, 4:438).27
I have emphasized three main formulas which could be taken as three standard formu-
lations of categorical imperative. "Kant says that all three are formulations of ‘the very 
same law,’ but diff er both ‘subjectively’ (in the way the law is presented to an agent) 
25 Cf. Wood, A. W., Kantian Ethics..., pp. 66–67., Guyer, P., op. cit., pp. 191–207., Wood, Allen W., "Kant’s 
Formulations of the Moral Law", in: Bird, Graham (ed.), A Companion to Kant, Blackwell Publishing, Malden – 
Oxford – Carlton, 2006., pp. 291–292.
26 Guyer, P., op. cit., p. 191.
27 Cf. Wood, A. W., Kantian Ethics..., pp. 66-67; Wood, A. W., "Kant’s Formulations...", pp. 291–292; Wood, A. 
W., "Th e Supreme Principle...", p. 358. Bold emphasis is mine.
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and also in the aspect of the law that they present."28 Th e mentioned aspects of cate-
gorical imperative are: "form", "matter" and "complete determination" (cf. 
4:436-437).29
Th e fi rst formula of categorical imperative is related to "form" of practical law. It gives 
just a formal condition for the possibility of such law. It "was derived from the con-
cept of a maxim that is compatible with this kind of imperative, and the general 
form that such a maxim would have to have."30 In Kant’s words, "a form (...) con-
sists in universality; and in this respect the formula of the moral imperative is ex-
pressed thus: that maxims should be chosen as if they were to hold as universal laws 
of nature". (4:436) For Kant, FUL/FLN provides to agent a formal condition for 
evaluating his maxims. It gives the agent condition for detecting if his maxim is 
"without contradiction", which means it could be willed as a universal law of every 
rational beings’ conduct (FUL) with adequate regularity as if it were a law of nature 
(FLN). Th e fi rst formula provides a test for permissibility of agent’s willing of max-
ims: if the maxim can be universalised it is permissible to follow it.31
Th e second formula is related to the "matter" of this law. It informs us about condi-
tions of cognitive application of the moral law. It "was derived from the concept of 
the substantive value (or the end) that could give us a rational ground to follow a 
categorical imperative."32 In Kant’s words: every maxim has also "a matter, namely 
an end, and in this respect formula says that a rational being, as an end by its nature 
and hence as an end in itself, must in every maxim serve as the limiting condition of 
all merely relative or arbitrary ends" (4:436). In FH Kant includes the most impor-
tant feature of categorical imperative, i.e. the notion of "humanity" as an uncondi-
tional value which is the ground of his entire ethical enterprise. Th us, many scholars 
interpret this formula recently as the most signifi cant one, from which all others de-
rive their strength.33 Th is formula is also the best answer to all of the so-called critics 
who object to Kant that his ethics is too formalistic. A. Wood provides the sharp 
answer to all such critics and it is important to bring in its fullness, because even to-
28 Wood, A. W., "Kant's Formulations...", p. 294.
29 Behind Kant’s presentation of moral law through the aspects of form, matter and complete determination 
lies the Leibnizian doctrine of forming the concepts. For a fuller account of Kant’s application of these logical 
assumptions to his concept of the moral law see Wood, A. W., "Kant’s Formulations...", pp. 293–294, 303 and 
Wood, A. W., Kantian Ethics..., pp. 68–69.
30 Wood, A. W., "Kant's Formulations...", p. 300.
31 For a fuller account of the meaning and scope of the First formula see Wood, A. W., "Kant’s Formulations...", 
pp. 293–298 and Wood, A. W., Kantian Ethics..., pp. 69–74.
32 Wood, A. W., "Kant's Formulations...", p. 300.
33 See for example Wood, A. W., "Kant’s Formulations..." and Guyer, P., op. cit., Ch. 5.
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day there are still critics who insist on this "formalistic" objection (even F. Jahr is 
taking this side, about which we will discuss below):
For example, Kant’s entire approach to ethics has been (and still is) widely 
described as "formalistic". He has been criticized for not providing (or even 
for not allowing the possibility of ) any substantive value lying behind the 
moral principle, or providing the rational will with any ground for being able 
to will one maxim, and not another, to be a universal law (or law of nature). 
Th e very concept of a categorical imperative has sometimes been rejected as 
nonsensical, on the ground that this concept precludes our having any 
substantive reason for obeying such an imperative. Schopenhauer, for 
instance, explained the alleged incoherence of Kant’s thinking by attributing 
to him an ethics of divine command but without admitting a divine lawgiver 
to back up the command. 
Such criticisms are obviated, however, at least in the form they are usually 
presented, as soon as we turn from Kant’s fi rst to his second formulation of 
the moral principle. For it deals explicitly with the "matter" of the principle, 
by which Kant means the "end" for the sake of which it is supposed to be 
rational to follow a categorical imperative. Kant’s "formalism" applies only to 
the fi rst stage of his development of the principle; it is complemented 
immediately by considering the principle from the opposite, "material" point 
of view, in which Kant inquires after our rational motive for obeying a 
categorical imperative, and locates this motive in the distinctive value that 
grounds morality, which he identifi es with a kind of end.34
Th e only end which could give the "matter" to the moral law but without jeopard-
izing the apodictic validity of the moral law is some of substantive values, which is 
an end in itself (it is not merely means for any other end). For Kant, the rational 
being is the only candidate for an end which has an "absolute worth" (4:428): "Now 
I say that the human being, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in 
itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion" (4:428). 
Kant provides a brief argument for assertion that "only ‘humanity’, understood in 
the technical Kantian sense of rational nature regarded as the capacity to set ends, 
can qualify as an end in itself: we value our own existence as an end in itself, but we 
34 Wood, A. W., "Th e Supreme...", p. 352. At another place he stresses: "It is deplorably common to regard 
FUL and FLN (usually not clearly distinguished from each other) as the chief, if not the only, formulation of the 
moral law. Even some of Kant’s most faithful defenders speak of them as ‘Th e Categorical Imperative’ (with capital 
letters) – as if there were no other, and no more adequate, formulations of the moral principle." (Wood, A. W., 
Kantian Ethics..., p. 69.)
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do it so rationally only insofar as we value the existence of other rational beings in 
precisely the same way."35 
Th e third formula is related to "complete determination". "Th e third formula com-
bines the conception of a law valid universally for all rational beings (in FUL) with 
the conception of every rational nature as having absolute worth [in FHE, added: 
I.E.], to get the idea of the will of every rational being as the source of a universally 
valid legislation."36 In Kant’s words, the one thing left is "a complete determination 
of all maxims by means of that formula, namely that all maxims from one’s own 
lawgiving are to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of 
nature" (4:436). By "realm of ends" Kant means "a systematic combination of vari-
ous rational beings through communal laws", or "whole of all ends in systematic 
connection" (4:433). Th e third formula brings stronger conclusion and "justifi es a 
correspondingly stronger conclusion about maxims, telling us not merely which 
ones are permissible and which not, but also which ones we have a positive duty to 
adopt because they are part of a system of universal moral legislation given by our 
own rational will."37 In other words Kant "completely determinates" the meaning 
and scope of moral law by the third formulation, which articulates universality and 
necessity of taking all rational beings as interconnected by the obligation of mutual 
respect of every one of them toward other ones by taking them always (also) as ends 
in themselves. Th is special realm of universal moral legislation is exactly the realm of 
morality, which diff erentiates all rational beings from other natural living and non-
living beings.
Even though this is just a sketch of Kant’s articulation of the moral law, it should be 
suffi  cient demonstration of powerfulness and strength of Kant’s grounding of "su-
preme principle of morality". Th is justifi catory power should be kept in mind dur-
ing refl ection on other attempts of grounding morality, among which the Jahr’s con-
cept of bioethical imperative is a specifi c and original one.
35 Wood, A. W., "Kant’s Formulation...", p. 299.
36 Ibid., p. 301.
37 Ibidem. By "realm of ends" Kant means "a systematic combination of various rational beings through com-
munal laws", or "whole of all ends in systematic connection" (4:433).
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Jahr’s concept of bioethical imperative
We can turn to Jahr’s concept of Bioethical Imperative38 now. Jahr completely aban-
dons Kant’s criteria for forming a concept of practical law. He also does not speak in 
terms of universal and necessary validity. Instead, he makes a few short remarks on 
the idea of his Bioethical Imperative, without extensive theoretical justifi cation 
(contrary to Kant’s practice).
Hans-Martin Sass points out that Fritz Jahr in a few published articles is "in close 
discussion with Kant, extending the formal Categorical Imperative towards a more 
encompassing content-based Bioethical Imperative"39. Jahr cites Kant in a few arti-
cles before the presentation of his Bioethical Imperative, which states:
Respect every living being on principle as an end in itself and treat it, if 
possible, as such!40
Th e echo of Kant’s second formula is obvious, but Jahr provides at least two very im-
portant changes. First, he calls for the extension of the application of practical law on 
all living beings. Second, he points out that following this law is an obligation when-
ever is it possible to follow it. Th us, the question is: can Jahr categorically demand such 
an imperative, and simultaneously keep the possibility of exceptions in following the 
law?
Jahr stands in critical relation to Kant, mostly looking on Kant’s thoughts in nega-
tive light41, but he also appreciates some parts of his opus, especially his disapproval 
of unnecessary torturing of animals presented in Th e Metaphysics of morals (cf. 
6:443). Jahr says about it further:
[S]enseless cruelty towards animals is an indication of an unrefi ned character 
becoming dangerous towards the human environment as well. Among other 
thinkers, philosopher Kant expressively has hinted at this fact of highest 
importance for social ethics, when in ‘Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der 
38 Writing ‘Bioethical Imperative’ in capital letters I’m trying even on the linguistic level to keep the essence of 
Jahr’s idea which will be explained below.
39 Sass, Hans-Martin, "European Roots of Bioethics: Fritz Jahr's 1927 Defi nition and Vision of Bioethics", in: 
Čović, Ante – Gosić, Nada – Tomašević, Luka (eds.), Od nove medicinske etike do integrativne bioetike/From New 
Medical Ethics to Integrative Bioethics, Pergamena – Hrvatsko bioetičko društvo, Zagreb, 2009, p. 22.
40 Jahr, Fritz, "Bioethics: Reviewing the Ethical Relations of Humans towards Animals and Plants", in: Sass, 
H.-M. (ed.), Selected Essays..., p. 4; Jahr, Fritz, "Th e Relationship of Animal Protection and Ethics", in: ibid., p. 8; 
Jahr, Fritz, "Th ree Studies on the Fifth Commandment", in: ibid., p. 23.
41 See for example Jahr, Fritz, "Egoism and Altruism: Two Basic Moral Problems, their Contradicition and 
Unifi cation in Social Life", in: ibid., pp. 12, 13; Jahr, F., "Th ree Studies...", p. 19.
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Tugendlehre’ [‘Metaphysical fi rst principles of the doctrine of virtue’, added: 
I.E.] he calls the careful and compassionate treatment of animals a human 
obligation towards oneself.42
But the most direct critical relation to Kant is presented by the extension of his 
moral imperative. Jahr "extends Kant’s moral imperative to all forms of life; but he 
modifi es the infl exible categorical structure of Kant’s model into a pragmatic and 
situational model of balancing moral obligations, rights and visions"43.
Jahr’s thoughts concerning Bioethical Imperative are scattered through a few essays 
and he did not provide any systematic account of his Imperative. So it is very useful 
to use Hans-Martin Sass’ attempt of providing a coherent reading and interpreta-
tion of Bioethical Imperative. He identifi es at least six major points in Jahr’s enter-
prise of expanding Kant’s imperative:
(1) Th e Bioethical Imperative guides ethical and cultural attitudes and 
responsibilities in the life sciences and towards all forms of life. (...) 
(2) Th e Bioethical Imperative is based on historical and other evidence that 
‘compassion is an empirical established phenomenon of the human soul’. (...) 
(3) Th e Bioethical Imperative strengthens and complements moral 
recognition and duties towards fellow humans in the Kantian context and 
should be followed in respect of human culture and mutual moral obligations 
among humans. (...) 
(4) Th e Bioethical Imperative has to recognize, to steward, and to cultivate the 
struggle for life among forms of life and natural and cultural living 
environments. (...) 
(5) Th e Bioethical Imperative implements compassion, love, and solidarity 
with all forms of life as a content-based principle and virtue into the ‘golden 
rule’ and into the Kant’s Categorical imperative, which are reciprocal and formal 
only. (...) 
(6) Th e Bioethical Imperative includes obligations towards one’s own body 
and soul as a living being.44
Bioethical Imperative with such a wide scope gives to Hans-Martin Sass a reason to 
state that "Jahr develops his vision of bioethics as a discipline, a principle, and a vir-
42 Jahr, F., "Th e Relationship...", p. 6.
43 Sass, H.-M., "Postscriptum...", p. 24.
44 Sass, H.-M., "European Roots...", pp. 22–25. Bold emphasis is mine.
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tue". He stresses that the "Bioethical Imperative is a guide for ethical and cultural atti-
tudes and responsibilities in the life sciences and towards all forms of life."45
He further emphasises that Jahr’s Bioethical Imperative, as extension of Kant’s for-
mal Categorical Imperative, is a more encompassing content-based imperative. He 
turns our attention to the fact that "the ‘sanctity’ of life is the foundation of Jahr’s 
1927 Bioethical Imperative, while 1788 Kant named ‘sanctity of moral law’46 as the 
foundation of the Categorical Imperative."47 Taking in consideration Jahr’s critical 
stand towards Kant he concludes that "Jahr’s imperative is content-rich; Kant’s im-
perative allows himself the luxury of formality only."48 On another place Sass states 
more sharply: "While Kant reserved his moral imperative to humans only kept it 
formal, Jahr’s imperative encompasses all living beings and their interactions in or-
der to present a fl exible and pragmatic imperative, which takes the struggle for life 
as an essential part of all life into account."49
Even though Sass points out that Kant’s imperative is unconditional and that Jahr’s 
one is conditional, he is convinced that they have similar motivation:
But Jahr and Kant share the concept that ethics and bioethics are categorical 
in as far as they do not depend on reciprocity. For Kant the moral imperative 
is unconditional regardless of whether fellow persons reciprocate. For Jahr 
reciprocity cannot be expected from nonhuman forms of life, and 
unfortunately also not from every human person. For Kant and Jahr, it is 
human dignity, expressing itself in the dignity of the individual conscience, 
that calls for moral action and attitude, for compassion, and for integrating 
ethics and expertise.50
If these thoughts are even partially true, the question is: how could a Kantian take 
into consideration Jahr’s views seriously, but at the same time not to jeopardize the 
stability and coherence of his ethical system?
45 Sass, Hans-Martin, "Asian and European Roots of Bioethics: Fritz Jahr’s 1927 Defi nition and Vision of 
Bioethics", Asian Bioethics Review, Vol. 1, Issue 3, 2009, p. 188.
46 Kant speaks about "holiness of the moral law" in his Critique of practical reason. (Cf. 5:82, 87.)
47 Sass, H.-M., "Asian...", p. 188. 
48 Ibidem.
49 Sass, H.-M., "Postscriptum...", p. 27.
50 Sass, Hans-Martin, "Fritz Jahr’s 1927 Concept of Bioethics", Kennedy Institute for Ethics Journal, 2008, Vol. 
17, No. 4, p. 287.
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Taking all these points into consideration, we could now ask: do these pose some 
challenges for Kant’s ethical thought? We can ask further: if they do, which chal-
lenges are in question?
Is there a challenge for Kant?
Kant would have had straightforward answers to all considerations, but the fi nal 
question would be: are these answers satisfactory? We should see which would be 
the Kantian answer to all six features of Bioethical Imperative listed above.
We can start with the last – sixth – consideration. Kant would agree with Jahr that 
there are obligations of beings toward themselves, but exclusively on the ground of 
rationality. For Kant, rational beings exclusively have obligations towards them-
selves, because they only can be moral agents. Ground for this claim is located in 
Kant’s theory of rationality and freedom, where those two concepts are taken as two 
sides of the same coin.
Th is is closely related to the fi rst point. Jahr demands extension of moral obligations 
on every living being. As said, Kant strongly argues for the thesis that just rational 
beings could be moral agents. Jahr’s advocates should fi rmly justify this demand, 
which does not necessarily have to be in contradiction with Kant’s imperative, but 
substantially upgrade it. Th e justifi cation of non-anthropocentric, more precisely 
bio-centric ethics is still needed.51
Jahr is going further in the fourth point: he advocates for extension of moral obliga-
tions on all natural and cultural environment. Th is point is even harder to justify 
because although we can fi nd some basis in arguing for obligations toward all living 
beings, there is much harder to fi nd such basis for a non-living matter.
Jahr’s guidelines for justifi cation of mentioned extension of the ethical imperative 
are contained in the second and the fi fth point. Th e second point suggests that em-
pirical facts in various cultures (customs and practices) provide solid bases for the 
bioethical imperative. Th e fi fth point indicates that many values should be included 
in the ethical imperative. Kant is clear about these two points. Against the fi rst, he 
argues that there are no empirical sources for practical law, because it has its seat ex-
clusively in reason and a priori reasoning. Against the second, Kant argues that there 
are only two absolute values, which can be the basis for categorical nature of practi-
51 For a one way of criticism of non-anthropocentric ethics, as the ones which lead in absurd positions see for 
example Čović, Ante, "Biotička zajednica kao temelj odgovornosti za ne-ljudska bića", in: Čović, A. – Gosić, N. 
– Tomašević, L., op. cit., pp. 33–46.
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cal law: "Th e only things which are good in themselves and thus of absolute worth 
are a good will and a person."52
Th e third point is the most interesting. It suggests that Jahr does not advocate for 
the cancellation of Kant’s imperative, but just for its upgrading and extension of his 
scope. Th is claim, as a postulate, has legitimate position in calling every Kantian 
ethics to provide fi rm grounds of Bioethical Imperative in Jahr’s sense.
At the end, three very important points should be noted. First, Kant’s categorical 
imperative, as we have seen above, is not at all formal as Jahr and other critics as-
sume. Kant provides a fi rm material basis for his moral law in the form of humanity 
as the substantive value. It is misleading to read Kant as a formalistic in the articula-
tion of his moral imperative.
Second, Jahr is starting from the results of (empirical) sciences of his days53 to give 
a basis for his arguments in favour of the Bioethical Imperative. Kant would never 
have accepted such methodology. For him, the "supreme principle of morality" can 
be determined exclusively a priori, because the practical law could not be based on 
the contingent empirical truths. Moral imperative should have its seat in reason 
alone, because this is the only way of securing its universality and necessity.
Th ird, Kant’s categorical imperative is, as its name says, a categorical demand. When 
the practical law is in question, the only acceptable form is categorical imperative. 
Jahr’s Bioethical Imperative leaves space for exceptions. It is hypothetical in its form.
Th ese three fi nal remarks are crucial in comparison of Kant’s and Jahr’s thought. 
Th ey form suffi  cient reason to rule out, from Kantian standpoint, the Bioethical 
Imperative as a possible constitutive principle54 of our morality. Th ere is eventually 
some possibility for its justifi cation as a regulative principle of our moral conduct.
Jahr does not provide thorough theoretical justifi cation for his Bioethical Imperative, 
but he poses, on the basis of new cognitions about living world, reference to Eastern 
wisdom and some intuitions of his contemporaries, a challenging question for Kan-
tian ethics: could Kantian ethics provide a justifi cation for our responsible behaviour 
to other living beings? Th is challenge could be formulated diff erently: can we fi nd 
some guidelines inside the Kantian philosophy to justify bioethical imperative?
52 Caygill, Howard, A Kant Dictionary, Blackwell Publishing, Malden – Oxford – Carlton, 2005, p. 411.
53 Cf. Sass, H.-M., "Postscriptum...", pp. 25, 26.
54 Kant’s categorical imperative is constitutive in the sense that it defi nes moral agents as rational/free beings, 
and vice versa: rationality and freedom are conditions for morality. Th us, categorical imperative is in the essence of 
rational being as practical being.
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Conclusion: possible Kantian answers to Jahr’s objections
Kantian scholars could reject Jahr’s Bioethical imperative on the basis of insuffi  cient 
justifi cation. But, Jahr’s thought, although not precise and thorough as Kant’s 
thought, could be a valuable guiding thread for a kind of bioethical re-reading of 
Kant’s philosophy. Such bioethical re-reading of Kant is simply necessary today in 
the epoch of bioethics55 and it is a challenge for every Kantian who tries to fi nd a 
true place of Kant’s thought in struggling with and answering to current bioethical 
issues. Having in mind the global environmental deterioration and endangering all 
life on earth56 Jahr’s ideas could be really seen as a "cultural and moral innovation for 
the 3rd millennium"57.
I can identify one possible way of trying to accomplish such project of re-reading of 
Kant. It starts with Kant’s philosophy of biology and on the grounds of teleological 
power of judgment tries to give a priori ground for establishing a kind of Kantian 
ecology58, which could be guided with bioethical imperative as its main regulative 
principle. In such reading, Bioethical Imperative would perhaps never accomplish 
the strength of constitutive principle of reason, but could take place of regulative 
principle of reason which could be an excellent supplement to the constitutive force 
of the categorical imperative in determination of our moral conduct.
To conclude, I see the central strength of Jahr’s thought, inside Kantian horizon, as 
a stimulator of a new bioethical re-reading of Kant’s, not just ethical, but whole 
philosophical heritage.
55 Cf. Čović, Ante, "Integrativna bioetika i pluriperspektivizam" ["Integrative bioethics and pluriperspectivism"], 
in: Valjan, Velimir (ed.), Integrativna bioetika i izazovi suvremene civilizacije, Bioetičko društvo u BiH, Sarajevo, 
2007, p. 71–72; Čović, Ante, Etika i bioetika: Razmišljanja na pragu bioetičke epohe, Pergamena, Zagreb, 2004, 
passim.
56 Cf. for example Cifrić, Ivan, Bioetička ekumena: Odgovornost za život susvijeta, Pergamena, Zagreb, 2007., 
passim (especially pp. 30–31).
57 Sass, Hans Martin, "Bioethics as a European Innovation. Fritz Jahr's 1927 Concept of Bioethics", in: Gimmler, 
Antje – Holzinger, Markus – Knopp, Lothar (eds.), Vernunft und Innovation: Über das alte Vorurteil für das Neue. 
Festschrift für Walther Ch- Zimmerli zum 65. Geburtstag, Wilhelm Fink, Paderborn, 2010., p. 369.
58 An attempt of providing such rereading of Kant is given in: Eterović, Igor, "Kantova teleologija kao podloga 
orijentiranju u ekologiji" ["Kant’s Teleology as a Basis for Orientation in Ecology"], Filozofska istraživanja 122, 
Vol. 31, No. 2, 2011, pp. 299–309.
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